


SENSITIVE

CIA/SAVA /WVIND 7/1204



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending 4 December 1971

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.







~~For the President Only~~

Top Secret


SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1971
Weekly average for each month

SEPTEMBER 1971 - DECEMBER 1971
Weekly data as reported




US BATTLE DEATHS decreased slightly from last week's five to four.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS

fell to 148 from the 230 of last week. The official total will change as late reports are received and will be lower than the figures released to the press by the GVN.




INFILTRATOR DETECTED IN PIPELINE

stand at five groups and twelve "gap-fill" groups totaling some 9,139. The number of infiltrators noted since 1 October 1971 is thus raised to an estimated 23,400 - 25,400.




ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS

dropped from last week's 308 to 282.




ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION

declined sharply to 808 from the 1,326 reported last week.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS

as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces decreased slightly to 96% from the 98% level of the previous three weeks.



Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

In South Vietnam, enemy-initiated activity during the past week has been at comparatively low levels country-wide. There is little to suggest that any significant change is imminent, though recent communications among elements of the Communist B-3 Front have followed a pattern which, in the past, has been indicative of a future increase in tactical activity. General Ngo Dzu, the GVN's Commander in Military Region (MR) 2, anticipates a serious Communist push in the Western Highlands and his concern is probably justified.

In Laos, military activity increased slightly in MR I as enemy forces attacked friendly units to the north and northeast of Luang Prabang. In MR II, there was light and sporadic enemy ground and shelling activity on the Plaine des Jarres. The Communists also continued to improve their lines of communication into that area and the recent NVA deployment of at least 6,000 replacements and reinforcements into north Laos appears to be completed. In the central Panhandle of south Laos there was only light contact during the actual week covered by this report, but early in the morning of 6 December friendly positions at Saravane came under attack and the town was subsequently abandoned under heavy pressure. Farther south, friendly units participating in Operation THAO LA, north of the Bolovens Plateau, were able to repulse three enemy assaults as they continued to search the enemy logistical base of Thateng.

In Cambodia, enemy-initiated activity along Route 6 increased substantially during the past week and has resulted in the withdrawal of all FANK forces to Kompong Thom, leaving the Communists in possession of all the territory they held prior to the start of the CHENLA II campaign. In the Phnom Penh Special Military Region (PPSMR), there has been a fairly high level of Communist attacks by fire and enemy-initiated light ground action. These attacks are probably being conducted by elements of two NVA regiments -- the 52nd and 101D -- of the Phuoc Long Front (a headquarters entity that used to be called the 1st NVA Division). In their effort to wipe out the former CHENLA II column and their increasing harassment of Phnom Penh's outskirts, the Communists appear to be making a major effort to embarrass the Cambodian government and to score tactical successes that could have a psychological impact well beyond Cambodia's borders. Farther south, ARVN forces involved in Operation TOAN THANG have still met only light resistance despite the fact that they are now well into enemy-held territory and seem to be steadily advancing on the Chup Plantation, a long-time Communist stronghold. The VC 5th and NVA 7th Divisions, however, are in position to counter-attack the advancing South Vietnamese force.

Enemy Infiltration

Southward personnel infiltration continued at a high level during the past week. Five battalion-size groups and 12 "gap-fill" groups totaling 9,139 men have been added to the infiltration totals, raising the estimated number of infiltrators moving toward South Vietnam-Cambodia since 1 October 1971 to some 23,400-25,400. Recent evidence, however, indicates that the infiltration of North Vietnamese units into north Laos has probably tapered off, at least for the time being. This deployment, which began on 15 October 1971, has to date involved some 6,000-8,000 personnel, including individual replacements and organic tactical units. In the logistics field, North Vietnamese activity in the Lao Panhandle is increasing, but it is only slightly more than one-half the level noted last year at this time. Communist logistic elements apparently have not completed their preparations for the dry season and are continuing "crash programs" to ready their areas for increased supply movements. Additionally, intermittent road construction (extending some 25 miles) has been detected on yet another major north-south route through the central Panhandle. If completed, this new road will provide a fourth corridor for the movement of supplies southward from the Tchepone area, thereby augmenting Routes 23, 99, and 92, the main supply arteries southward.

South Vietnam Developments

On 3 December, the Lower House overwhelmingly elected the pro-government slate -- the only slate put forward -- of officers and committee chairmen, thus strengthening President Thieu's hand in that body. The new officers are generally viewed as more able than their predecessors. Progressive Nationalist Force (PNM) legislators were not represented on the successful slate, but this does not necessarily mean that the PNM will not support key government legislation in the Lower House.

The effort to form a pro-government, mass political party appears to be moving into the formative, organizational phase. Instrumental in this effort is Thieu's brother Nguyen Van Kieu, who is alleged to be trying to line up a coalition of the PNM, the Farmer-Worker Party, and some lesser parties and factions into a so-called "Democratic Union Party." No date has yet been set for this new group's public debut. While some reports indicate that Kieu may play a leading role in the party's future affairs, Thieu himself is said to be against having his brother assume any such role in view of the parallels that would be drawn to the Diem-Nhu era.

Communist Developments

The Communists' 3 December announcement of their holiday truce periods (three days over Christmas, three days over New Years, and four days over Tet in mid-February) generally corresponds to the Communist position taken last year. The announcement does not reflect any new Communist interest in an extended cease fire; on that topic, the Communists are sticking firmly to the line taken in the PRG's "seven points."

~~Top Secret~~